Labour and foreign policy: the third country way
On the last day of January, I was in Westminster Cathedral Hall as Keir Starmer gave a speech to mark the UK’s departure from the European Union. In the shadow of Exit Day and the Conservatives’ landslide victory the month before, the speech attracted little attention. But Starmer used the occasion to hint at his vision for the UK as a third country outside the EU: a nation that respected the rights of foreign nationals; that would put values at heart of its future trade policy; and one that was mindful of its past legacies, particularly in Ireland.
Since then, Starmer and the party he leads have had little space to flesh out how they see Britain’s place in the world after Brexit. COVID-19 has rightly turned the new shadow frontbench’s focus homewards, and some issues — notably the UK’s future relationship with the EU — have juddered to a halt as the bandwidth of central government shrinks. The inheritance bequeathed to Starmer by his predecessor is also lamentable, with the structures of the party ill-placed to support him and Shadow Foreign Secretary Lisa Nandy in developing a new foreign policy agenda.
But the world is not waiting. Global trends that emerged while the UK was tearing itself apart over Brexit have only accelerated with the pandemic. The international trade and security order remains under strain. The situation in Europe’s near-neighbourhoods, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, continues to deteriorate. Authoritarian governments are using the fallout from COVID-19 to enhance their power at home and abroad. Sooner or later, Labour must start thinking again about where and how it sees the UK exerting influence as a third country.
In some cases, the party will have little choice but to react to circumstance, and the agenda set by those in power. Following the spread of COVID-19, senior Conservative lawmakers are already demanding a much tougher approach to relations with China. In doing so, they correctly identify aspects of the UK’s Government approach that have failed to keep pace with reality on the ground, especially in respect of Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan. But as some China observers have argued in the US, there are risks in replacing one orthodoxy with another. Where should the UK work with the EU and US to put limits on Chinese influence, and where should it look to put a brake on dangerous escalation?
Crafting the right approach to China will inevitably raise difficult questions about whether the world can be neatly divided into separate camps as it was a generation ago. Some American leaders have proposed an alliance of nations to cut China’s predatory behaviour out of the global order. Yet it is not clear whether the pillars of a liberal bloc will survive another term of President Trump or future administrations led by other nationalistic Republicans. To its credit, the current UK government has sought to bolster institutions like the WTO through alliance-building with nations such as Japan. But more expansive thinking is needed to anticipate the upheaval that might be around the corner.
With its institutions diminished, the harder it will be for the world to act collectively to deal with new challenges to free peoples and societies. Democracy continues to erode within the EU’s borders, with both the governments of Hungary and Poland chipping away at political pluralism. On the edge of the EU, COVID-19 has exposed the fecklessness of Belarus’s government towards its citizens at a moment when the country is under significant pressure from Russia. Starmer’s politics of rights should equip Labour to speak up for the freedom of oppressed people both in Europe and beyond. Working out what practical tools the UK can deploy to support them, whether in concert with the EU or bilaterally, will be key.
Settling on what policy levers the UK should pull as a nation outside the EU also matters for the greatest long-term threat the world faces: climate change. Here the UK has an opening to define itself in the post-Brexit era with its role as host of COP26. But it will need to do more than simply position itself as the co-ordinator of global emissions agreements, especially with the European Commission already thinking about how to adapt its European Green Deal in light of COVID-19. Should Labour be pushing for alignment with this agenda or crafting a platform that makes the UK a de facto rule-maker on environmental policy, as suggested by some European Green leaders?
Both Starmer and Nandy are better equipped than their recent predecessors to answer some of these questions. Neither is hamstrung by the kind of Manichean worldview embraced by Jeremy Corbyn, and both have proved themselves far more willing than Corbyn to reach out beyond a narrow circle for expertise and evidence. They will need all of that skill to ensure Labour can speak for Britain in an increasingly uncertain world.
Photo: Chatham House
